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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)0).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Bad Boys Bail Bonds, Inc's
Motion to Set Aside Judgment and ordering Bad Boys to pay the $10,000?
Standard of Review: "A trial court has discretion in determining whether a movant has
shown rule 60(b) grounds, and this court will reverse the trial court's ruling only when
there has been an abuse of discretion." Swallow v. Kennard, 2008 UT App 134, ^f 19,
183 P.3d 1052 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v.
Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, ^ 9, 2 P.3d 451). Specifically, in "the context of a denial of a
rule 60(b) motion, [the Court] review[s] a district court's findings of fact under a clear
error standard of review . . . while [the Court] reviewfs] a district court's conclusions of
law for correctness, affording the trail court no deference." Id.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

THE NATURE OF THE CASE.
The Appellee in this case is Dixon Building, L.L.C. ("Dixon"). The Appellant in

this case, Bad Boys Bail Bonds, Inc. ("Bad Boys"), is appealing an order and judgment of
the district court, which found that Bad Boys had to pay Dixon $10,000.
The dispute in this case arose from an unlawful detainer proceeding initiated by
Dixon against its former commercial tenants, Adrian Jefferson and Rosae L. Jefferson
1

(the "Jeffersons") for nonpayment of rent. At the immediate occupancy hearing in the
unlawful detainer matter, the district court ordered the Jeffersons to pay the amounts
owing under the lease, post a $10,000 cash or property bond with the court, or vacate the
premises within seventy-two hours. The Jeffersons paid Bad Boys to post a bond, which
Bad Boys posted, thereby allowing the Jeffersons to remain in possession of the premises
until an evidentiary hearing on the eviction could be held.
At the evidentiary hearing, the district court entered judgment for Dixon, ordering
the Jeffersons to vacate the premises and pay Dixon a total judgment of $19,343.53. The
district court likewise ordered that the posted bond be forfeited to Dixon. Bad Boys
moved the district court to set aside its order that the bond be forfeited, but the district
court denied Bad Boys' motion to set aside. Thereafter, Bad Boys moved the court to
reconsider its decision denying Bad Boys' motion to set aside the order forfeiting the
bond, but the district court again ruled against Bad Boys and found in favor of Dixon.
This appeal arises from that ruling.
II.

THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE
COURT BELOW.
On May 9, 2008, Dixon commenced the proceeding below by filing a Complaint

in the district court, seeking to evict the Jeffersons and recover damages based on the
Jeffersons' unlawful detainer. [R. at 1-38.]
On June 9, 2008, the district court ordered the Jeffersons to post a $10,000 cash or
property bond or vacate the premises within seventy-two hours, and signed an order to
this end on June 11, 2008. [R. at 81, 88-89.]
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On June 11, 2008, Bad Boys posted a $105000 bond on the Jeffersons' behalf. [R.
at 82-83.]
On June 30, 2008, after an evidentiary hearing, the district court ordered the
Jeffersons to vacate the premises by July 6, 2008 and pay damages totaling $19,343.53 to
Dixon. [R. at 181.] The district court likewise ordered the $10,000 bond be forfeited to
Dixon on this date, and signed an order to this end on July 7, 2008. [Id, R. at 190-191.]
On July 25, 2008, Bad Boys filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment, For Joinder,
and Exoneration of Bond ("Motion to Set Aside Judgment") related to the district court's
July 7th Order. [R. at 198-212.]
On August 11, 2008, Dixon filed an objection to Bad Boys' Motion to Set Aside
Judgment. [R. at 215-229.]
On August 25, 2008, the district court issued its Minute Entry and Order on Bad
Boys' Motion to Set Aside Judgment, finding in favor of Dixon. [R. at 230-232.]
On September 15, 2008, Dixon filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause Against
Bad Boys. [R. at 241-243.]
On October 8, 2008, Bad Boys filed a Motion to Reconsider its Motion to Set
Aside Judgment ("Motion to Reconsider"), and a response to Dixon's Motion for Order
to Show Cause. [R. at 247-259.]
On November 19, 2008, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Bad
Boys' Motion to Reconsider and Dixon's Order to Show Cause, at the conclusion of the
hearing the district court took the matter under advisement. [R. at 274, 306.]
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On November 24, 2008, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision and
Order, finding in favor of Dixon. [R. at 275-277.] On December 24, 2008, the district
court signed a final Judgment, ordering Bad Boys to pay Dixon $10,000 plus statutory
interest thereon and finding Bad Boys in contempt of court for failing to abide by the
district court's August 25, 2008 Order, this Judgment was filed by the district court on
December 29, 2008. [R. at 287-289.]
On December 24, 2008, Bad Boys filed a Notice of Appeal. [R. at 285-286.]
III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR
REVIEW,
1.

All of the preceding paragraphs with citations to the Record constitute facts

of the case.
2.

The district court found that "Bad Boys was or should have been aware that

this is a civil lawsuit dealing with unlawful detainer and not a criminal action, which is
apparently the typical forum where Bad Boys issues bonds." [R. at 231.]
3.

Continuing, the district court noted, "Regardless of the alleged

representations from court personnel, Bad Boys is in the business of issuing bonds and,
again, should have been aware that a possession bond is very different from a bail bond."
[R. at 231.]
4.

In denying Bad Boys' Motion to Set Aside Judgment, the district court

determined that Bad Boys was not without a remedy because it could pursue one against
the Jeffersons. [R. at 231.]

5.

In addressing Bad Boys' Motion to Reconsider, the district court found

"that Bad Boys was uniquely qualified to discern the difference between various types of
bonds." [R. at 275-276.]
6.

Continuing, the district court stated, "Clearly, Bad Boys understood that it

was posting a bond in the context of a civil case and not a criminal case." [R. at 276.]
7.

Concluding, the district court said, "[Bad Boys'] failure to seek counsel and

its purported reliance on court personnel does not relieve Bad Boys of its obligations
under the bond." [R. at 276.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Bad Boys was uniquely qualified to discern the difference between a bail

bond used in a criminal setting and a cash or possession bond used in the unlawful
detainer setting. Given this unique qualification, it was unreasonable for Bad Boys to
rely on purported misrepresentations by court personnel regarding the appropriate type of
bond for this unlawful detainer proceeding. The Court should affirm the decision of the
district court finding that Bad Boys is not excused from its obligation to pay Dixon the
bond amount because of Bad Boys' purported reliance on court personnel, as any such
reliance was not reasonable given Bad Boys' unique status.
2.

The Court should affirm the decision of the district court and not allow Bad

Boys to change this proceeding from an unlawful detainer proceeding into a criminal bail
bond proceeding. While Bad Boys was compensated for posting the bond, it now argues
it should not have to pay out on the bond because the bond it posted was the wrong type
of bond. However, as the district court found, Bad Boys was uniquely positioned to
5

discern the difference between various types of bonds. Therefore, Bad Boys should not
be allowed to place the blame for its neglect on any other person, and likewise should not
be allowed to have the rules of its mistakenly filed bond govern this proceeding.
ARGUMENT
L

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT BAD BOYS
WAS UNIQUELY QUALIFIED TO DISCERN THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN VARIOUS TYPES OF BONDS AND THAT ITS
PURPORTED RELIANCE ON COURT PERSONNEL DOES NOT
EXCUSE IT OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE BOND.
On two separate occasions, the district court correctly found that Bad Boys was

uniquely qualified to discern the difference between various types of bonds. Because of
Bad Boys' unique qualifications in the bond industry and its daily business of issuing
bonds, Bad Boys' alleged reliance on court personnel regarding the type of bond to be
posted in the underlying unlawful detainer proceeding does not excuse it of its
obligations under the bond at issue in this matter. Moreover, given Bad Boys' business
of issuing bonds and unique qualifications in the bond industry, it cannot now avoid its
obligation to Dixon by arguing the bond it posted was an improper bond for an unlawful
detainer action. Therefore, the Court should affirm the district court's ruling.
A. BAD B O Y S ' PURPORTED RELIANCE O N COURT PERSONNEL DOES N O T EXCUSE
ITS OBLIGATION T O PAY DIXON T H E BOND AMOUNT,

After hearing arguments from landlord-plaintiff Dixon and tenant-defendants
Jeffersons at the immediate occupancy hearing in the underlying unlawful detainer action
on the afternoon of June 9, 2008, the Honorable Judge Dever for the district court issued
a ruling from the bench ordering the Jeffersons to either (a) execute and file a possession
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bond in the amount of $10,000.00 in the form of a cash bond or property bond within 72
hours, or (b) vacate the premises at issue in the lawsuit within 72 hours. An order
containing the terms of the district court's ruling was signed and filed by the district court
two days later, on June 11, 2008 (the "June 11th Order") [R. at 88-89.]
With regard to the bond alternative, the June 11 Order specifically states the
Defendants were required to
[E]xecute and file a possession bond in the amount of $10,000.00, in the
form of a cash bond or property bond, payable to the clerk of court for the
benefit of Plaintiff Dixon Building, L.L.C., for all costs and damages
actually adjudged against you in this action . . . .
J.L.

[Emphasis added]. This June 11 Order was clear on its face. The bond required was a
possession bond - the precise type of bond used in the unlawful detainer setting and
contemplated by the unlawful detainer statutes. See Utah Code Annotated § 78B-6-808
(2008).
As noted in both the June 11th Order and in the unlawful detainer statute, the
purpose of this possession bond was to insure Dixon that it could collect the probable
amount of the costs of the lawsuit and damages in the event it was ultimately determined
that the Jeffersons had improperly withheld possession of the premises. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-6-808(4)(b)(vi). Dixon relied on the district court's June 11th Order in good
faith, knowing the very reason the district court ordered the Jeffersons to post a
possession bond was to protect Dixon against any damages ultimately adjudged against
the Jeffersons based on their unlawful detainer of the premises.

Ultimately, after an evidentiary hearing on the unlawful detainer matter before the
Honorable Judge Faust, the district court did indeed determine the Jeffersons had been
unlawfully detaining the premises, and ordered the Jeffersons to pay Dixon damages and
costs in the amount of $19,343.53. The district court likewise issued an Order For
Payment of Possession Bond wherein it mandated that "Bad Boys Bail Bonds shall forfeit
to Craig Mecham of Dixon Building, L.L.C. the sum of $10,000.00, to be paid from the
Possession Bond filed with the Court by Adrian Jefferson and Rosae L. Jefferson on or
about June 11, 2008." [R. at 190-191.]
Bad Boys refused to comply with the district Court's Order for Payment of the
Possession Bond. Bad Boys' argument then and now is that it should not have to pay the
bond amount because it detrimentally relied on representations of court employees in
posting the bond.
The question of reliance is a factual question for the trier of fact to decide.
Berkeley Bankfor Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah 1980); see also Gold
Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1067 (Utah 1996).
When challenging a trial court's findings, an appellant must marshal the
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against
the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. . . .
Due to the trial court's advantaged position, the presumptions favor its
judgment. Where there is dispute and disagreement in the evidence, we
assume that the trial judge believed those aspects and fairly drew the
inferences to be derived therefrom which gave his decision support....
Furthermore, we will uphold the trial court's findings unless we conclude
that they are not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes
in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination.
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Larry J. Coet Chevrolet v. Labrum, 2008 UT App 69, \ 27, 180 P.3d 765 (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
At the evidentiary hearing on November 19, 2008, the district court heard
evidence from Bad Boys relating to Bad Boys' alleged reliance on court
personnel, as well as its argument that it should be excused from performing under
the bond based on the representations from court personnel. [R. at 274, 306.]
However, after considering the evidence presented by Bad Boys in support of its
position, the district court ruled against Bad Boys finding that "Its failure to seek
counsel and its purported reliance on court personnel does not relieve Bad Boys of
its obligation under the bond." [R. at 276.]
The district court's findings in regard to Bad Boys' reliance were based on live
testimony and are adequately supported by the record and must be given deference based
on the district court's advantaged position as the trier of fact. Therefore, this Court
should uphold the district court's determination that Bad Boys should not be relieved of
its obligations under the bond as stated in its November 24, 2008 Memorandum Decision
and Order.
B. GIVEN BAD BOYS' UNIQUE QUALIFICATIONS T O DISCERN T H E DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN VARIOUS TYPES O F BONDS, BAD BOYS SHOULD N O T B E ALLOWED
To AVOID PAYING DIXON T H E JUDGMENT AMOUNT BECAUSE I T POSTED T H E
W R O N G TYPE O F BOND.

Although it profited by posting the bond, Bad Boys now argues that it should be
forgiven of its obligations to perform under the bond and be released from paying the
judgment amount to Dixon because the bond it posted was not the type of bond required
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in an unlawful detainer proceeding. However, as the district court correctly found, Bad
Boys was uniquely positioned to discern the difference between various types of bonds,
and its failure to post the appropriate type of bond does not relieve it of its obligations
under the bond. Bad Boys should not be allowed to place the blame and resulting
consequences of its own errors and neglect on Dixon or the court personnel, as it sought
to do in its Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Motion to Reconsider, and as it now again
seeks to do in this appeal.
Bad Boys spends a large portion of its brief discussing bail bonds and making
arguments based on the law applicable to bail bonds. [See Brief of Appellant, at 18-23,
34-37]. However, such analysis is inapposite in the case at bar. Bad Boys posted a bond
in what it clearly knew was a civil unlawful detainer action. Bad Boys must not be
allowed to hijack this case into a proceeding governed by criminal statutes applicable to
bail bonds based on its choice to ignore the applicable unlawful detainer statutes in
posting the bond. This Court should find that Bad Boys' application of the law of bail
bonds is inapplicable in the case at bar, and affirm the district court's order.1

1

On appeal, Bad Boys also argues the district court erred by denying Bad Boys' motion
for joinder. However, Bad Boys was fully heard in regard to this matter. In its August
25, 2008 Order, the district court refused to join Bad Boys as a party defendant and found
that Bad Boys had no standing to advance its motion, but nevertheless fully considered
Bad Boys' Motion To Set Aside Judgment and rendered a judgment on the merits after
considering Bad Boys' arguments. [R. at 230-231.] Moreover, the district court likewise
considered all of the arguments Bad Boys raised in its Motion to Reconsider and held an
evidentiary hearing - at which it allowed Bad Boys to present evidence - before entering
its final decision. [R. at 274-276.] The orders impacting Bad Boys were the July 7,
2008 Order for Payment of Possession Bond [R. at 190-191.] and November 24, 2008
Memorandum Decision and Order [R. at 275] pertaining to the Order to Show cause.
Neither of these orders required that Bad Boys be a party to the proceeding.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Dixon respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
district court's November 24, 2008 Memorandum Decision and Order.
DATED this 5 ^ day of August, 2009.

McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

Nickolas S.ftUce
Attorneys for the Dixon Building, L.L.C.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 5 " * day of August, 2009,1 caused two true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE DIXON BUILDING, L.L.C,
together with a compact disk containing a PDF version of the same, to be sent, via U.S.
Mail, to the following:

C. Danny Frazier
Attorney for Bad Boys Bail Bonds, Inc.
170 West Research Way, Suite 104
West Valley City, Utah 84119
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